Originally reported by Deep Tide TechFlow on November 12, 2026, at 09:58 (UTC+8), in a report authored by the Bitcoin Security Consortium and published jointly with Presidio Bitcoin.
The report argues that quantum computing poses a potential threat to Bitcoin’s signatures, but no cryptographically relevant quantum computer has been demonstrated. Its distinction is between coins whose public keys are already exposed and transactions that reveal a public key while awaiting confirmation. Neither risk means all Bitcoin could be stolen at once.
Two possible attack windows
A sufficiently capable quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could, in theory, derive a private key from an exposed public key. Reused addresses and early pay-to-public-key (P2PK) outputs create this at-rest exposure. The report cites Project Eleven’s estimate that roughly 7.1 million BTC, or about 35% of total supply, would be at risk if such a machine existed today. It says around three-quarters of that amount is held at reused addresses, mainly at large exchanges. This is an estimate of exposure, not a report of theft.
For outputs whose public keys remain hidden until spent, the report describes a different, in-flight risk: a transaction reveals the key before it is included in a block. It cites Google’s estimate that a hypothetical fast quantum device could derive one private key in as little as nine minutes—potentially within the roughly ten-minute interval the report uses to illustrate that window. That device does not currently exist.
Recent hardware demonstrations and proposed optimizations to Shor’s algorithm are reasons to study the problem, not evidence that Bitcoin keys have been cracked. The report contrasts the 48 error-corrected logical qubits it attributes to Quantinuum’s publicly demonstrated system with the approximately 1,200 it says would be needed to break Bitcoin’s elliptic-curve cryptography. It also identifies reliable computation at that scale as an unresolved engineering hurdle.
Responses remain at different stages
Moving funds from reused addresses to unused ones does not require a network rule change, although holders and custodians must make those moves themselves. Blockstream’s proposed SHA-256-based post-quantum signature scheme, SHRINCS, was tested on Liquid in March 2026; a Bitcoin Improvement Proposal followed in August. According to the report, its formal security proof was still in progress, and deployment across Bitcoin would require a soft fork. It is not an enacted Bitcoin-wide protection.
What to do with older P2PK coins is less settled. The report describes proposals to leave existing spending rules intact, limit the rate of spending from older outputs, or freeze them while offering a proof-based recovery route. It gives approximately 1.8 million BTC in P2PK outputs in one section, but later cites approximately 1.7 million BTC across 20,000 P2PK addresses. Those differing figures should not be mistaken for a precise, reconciled count. Nor has the network agreed to any of the proposed restrictions.
The sober reading: the attack surfaces are identifiable, but the machine needed to exploit them has not been shown to exist. The hardest policy question—how to treat exposed old coins—remains open.
Source: techflowpost.com (originally published 2026-11-12 09:58 UTC+8)



